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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5453
This paper examines fiscal outcomes in Eastern and 
Central European countries before and during the global 
crisis of 2008–2010. These outcomes are evaluated 
in the context of overall changes in fiscal institutions 
and global market conditions. Eastern and Central 
European countries’ situations improved dramatically in 
the pre-crisis period as tax revenues boomed, and fiscal 
institutions were reformed. Expenditures increased quite 
significantly in real terms for some of the countries in 
the pre-crisis era so that when tax revenues collapsed in 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to analyze the effects of the Great Economic crisis and to disseminate work done 
in region. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at lbarbone@worldbank.org or rislam@worldbank.org. 
the wake of the crisis, the countries were left with large 
deficits. Institutional reform helped countries manage 
their fiscal situations better, but the crisis also exposed 
shortcomings of the status quo. In the post-crisis period, 
fiscal institutions aimed at promoting fiscal discipline are 
being strengthened. Governments will also need to take 
a closer look at the sustainability of current expenditure 
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  In the years prior to the onset of the great crisis of 2008, high growth rates and a 
favorable external environment led to a decade of promising fiscal developments for countries in 
Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia (ECA).  They saw an unprecedented increase in 
fiscal resources as tax revenues burgeoned with accelerating growth rates.  Public debt fell 
dramatically as a share of GDP.  But rising revenues also meant that fiscal expenditures could 
grow; while expenditure growth rates were below those of revenue, they were still high, 
especially since the mid 2000s.  The size of government did not fall, but rose in many cases. At 
the same time, for a large majority of the countries under consideration, the last decade saw the 
consolidation of deep institutional reforms, starting in many cases in the early 1990s, which 
aimed to dramatically change the way in which public expenditures and revenues were handled. 
Against this backdrop, came the global crisis and the impact on growth in ECA countries was 
severe. Consequently, fiscal outcomes suffered significantly.  
This paper reviews fiscal outcomes during the 2000s against the backdrop of high growth 
rates and institutional advances across the region.  In three cases, Turkey, Poland and Russia, we 
examine in detail how fiscal outcomes may have been affected by the types of fiscal institutions 
that countries adopted during the period leading up to the crisis.  We find that not all institutional 
reforms were effective, partly because some (such as fiscal rules) may have been too inflexible to 
be operationally relevant in a crisis situation.  Yet, on average, institutional reforms did help 
countries to better manage their fiscal situation.  The first section reviews the macroeconomic 
and fiscal outcomes in ECA countries during the years leading up to the crisis of 2008-09 and the 
policies adopted in response to the crisis.  The second section discusses the institutional reforms Page | 3  
 
that were being adopted during this time and the third section focuses on how institutional 
reform in three countries, Poland, Russia and Turkey, in the period leading up to the crisis and in 
the crisis affected fiscal outcomes. 
I.  Fiscal Institutions and Outcomes 
This paper draws from an extensive literature in exploring the relationship between fiscal 
institutional designs and fiscal outcomes.  It builds on the insight that the public budget is subject 
to a common-pool problem where individual agencies (interest groups) tend towards over-
consuming the (common) resource- public funds (Weingast, 1981 and Weingast 198, Shepsle 
and Johnson, 1981).  Thus more fractured public sectors would have a greater tendency to over-
spend, generate deficits, and grow debt, a view that has been confirmed by empirical 
investigations beginning in the early 1990s with the work by Jurgen von Hagen and others (1992, 
1994, 1996, 2006, 2008) concerning EU fiscal systems. Velasco (1999), Tornell and Lane (1999) 
have formalized this insight. 
The approach to measuring the degree of fiscal fragmentation has centered on the powers 
of the ministry of finance in the three main stages of budgeting: preparation, approval and 
implementation. Fiscal centralization corresponds to situations where the finance minister has a 
strong role in setting and enforcing fiscal targets, resolving conflicts over spending, and has the 
authority to block expenditures in order to ensure that actual expenditures do not exceed 
authorized levels.  In addition, the legislature has limited powers to amend the budget or increase 
aggregate expenditure.  The finding has been that rules giving the ministry of finance strategic 
dominance on budgetary arrangements and in enforcing budget discipline, and limiting the 
amending power of parliaments and the opportunities for modification during implementation 
are “strongly conducive to fiscal discipline, i.e. relatively small deficits and public debt.” Page | 4  
 
(Hagen, 1992, p.53).  That centralization of authority over allocation and during execution of 
budgets matters for fiscal outcomes has been confirmed for later periods for the EU and EU 
accessions countries by the same and other authors (see Mulas-Granados, etc. (2006).  It has also 
been found relevant for Latin America by Alesina et al. (1999b) and Stein et al. (1999), and Filc 
et al. (2004).  Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) find evidence that the relationship between the design of 
fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes holds in low-income countries as well. 
Political fragmentation has also been found to drive fiscal outcomes indirectly by 
precluding or facilitating agreements on core institutional designs and, directly, through the 
competition for budgetary resources.  Fabrizio and Mody (2008) review the channels linking 
politics to fiscal outcomes. In politically fragmented environments, a “desirable” allocation of 
mandates may be infeasible because political actors may fail to come to an agreement on 
institutional consolidation. Hagen and Hallerberg (1999) contend that in such environments a 
“contract” as opposed to a “delegation” approach works better.  The contract approach would 
seek agreements among relevant parties at the start of the budgeting process, with the bargaining 
among the parties providing the framework for developing a comprehensive view of the budget 
thus overcoming the common pool externality. In extreme case, however, the symbiosis between 
institutional and political fragmentation can lead to tightly-knotted arrangements that delay 
reforms and follow the dynamics described by Alesina and Drazen (1993.)  
Transparency in budgetary practices as an aide to delivering better fiscal outcomes has 
also received attention in the literature: transparency can help prevent players from hiding 
incomes, expenditures and especially negative fiscal outcomes. But implementing transparency 
can be difficult in practice. Alesina and Perotti (1999) in discussing the relevance of 
transparency pointed to possible measurement difficulties.  International institutions have Page | 5  
 
invested in developing transparency measurement criteria such as the IMF Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency, which has been used to produce Reports on Observation of 
Standard and Codes (ROSC) for a large number of countries. Using information from these 
reports Hameed (2005) finds that transparency matters to delivering fiscal discipline, controlling 
corruption and achieving better credit ratings. (See also Debrun, and Kumar, (2007) on the 
disciplining role of transparency. Alesina (2010) is of the view that transparency in the budget 
and outcomes is the most important element in delivering good fiscal outcomes because it is 
more difficult for pressure groups to hide wasteful programs in an environment of greater 
transparency.  
The traditional focus on (primary) deficits and debt to GDP ratios has been shifting to the 
pro-cyclical fiscal behavior of governments, something which seems ubiquitous in developed, 
transition and developing economies. Fragmentation and lack of transparency are found also to 
explain pro-cyclical fiscal behavior. Alesina et al. (2008) indicate that in developing countries 
pro-cyclical behavior is likely to be linked with a lack of transparency. Given that pro-cyclical 
behavior occurs even in European economies ranked high on transparency standards, other 
factors are likely to be at play. Complementary explanations therefore point to the inability to 
make credible inter-temporal commitments to the future allocation of resources. Balasone, and 
Kumar (2007) review the challenges of cyclical behavior for fiscal institutional design.  
In countries around the world, considerable attention has been given to improving fiscal 
institutional designs anchored on the emerging consensus that institutions matter for fiscal 
outcomes. Fiscal institutions of various types have been adopted to counter budgetary 
fragmentation and non-transparency in fiscal policy. The underlying presumption is that certain 
budgetary procedures could reduce institutional fragmentation, increase transparency and Page | 6  
 
improve fiscal outcomes; these procedures are often strengthened when they are supported by 
quantitative targets which facilitate adherence and monitoring.  Within this strategic framework, 
the on-going efforts to tame pro-cyclical behavior and ad-hoc changes in budgets emphasize the 
introduction of Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), or multi-year fiscal policy and 
planning embedded in consistent macro-economic projections. MTEFs, along with other 
measures to bolster data release, enhance transparency, and by facilitating discussions on 
quantitative and monitorable outcomes, facilitate good policymaking. In practice, the worldwide 
experience, including that in transition economies, over the last two decades indicates that such 
investments in supporting fiscal systems take time to design and implement.   
One type of fiscal institution, fiscal rules, have a long and successful history at sub-
national levels in the US and in Switzerland. At the national level, they have become popular 
worldwide only recently. In 1990, five countries had fiscal rules at the national level; over 80 
countries today have them. Fiscal rules can be adopted nationally or be part of external 
agreements like they are for the EU countries. Some countries (e.g. Poland) have both national 
and supranational rules. The design of fiscal rules varies but overall the focus of these rules is to 
constrain fiscal aggregates by introducing ceilings on fiscal balances, public debt to GDP, or 
overall expenditures, or by setting overall revenue targets. The literature finds that rules may 
enhance fiscal discipline. However, focusing on rules that are not binding in good times (when 
revenues are rising fast) may not impede pro-cyclical behavior and a deterioration in fiscal 
policy. Therefore, better designed fiscal rules would place greater emphasis on debt 
sustainability and smoothing expenditures over the economic cycle with an emphasis on 
structural deficits in an effort to address inter-temporal inconsistencies. Recently Chile adopted a 
fiscal rule, whose design takes these issues into account. The inherent risk in defining and using Page | 7  
 
these rules, however, lies in increasing the complexity by requiring a good understanding of 
where the economy is in the cycle and identifying the “special circumstances” that may require 
deviating from them. Differentiating between cyclical downturns, short term shocks and longer 
term trends is not an easy matter, even in developed countries.  
 There is also some skepticism about the role of rules. This skepticism centers on the 
observation that rules work best when they are not binding. Schick (2009) notes that “Fiscal rules 
should have much of their bite when the economy is strong; if they do not, they may do much 
harm and little good when the economy is weak.” Thus, the test of rules and strong institutions 
more generally is the ability to manage the good times. Institutions that complement fiscal rules 
and bolster inter-temporal consistency of fiscal policy are Independent Fiscal Agencies 
(Eichengreen, Haussman and Hagen (1999)). The concept of establishing fiscal agencies to 
independently assess, monitor and evaluate fiscal policy builds on the positive experience with 
Central Bank independence and the conduct of monetary policy. Potential mandates for such 
agencies include setting the yearly level of the deficit or surplus and ensuring debt sustainability; 
in the case of an abrupt economic change the agency would have the mandate to adjust the fiscal 
stance as needed. Fiscal agencies, with a variety of mandates, have been emerging with a focus 
on independent forecasts, analysis or normative judgments; these types of agencies can help meet 
institutional deficiencies specific to individual countries.   
A working hypothesis today is that fiscal institutions can support good policy making and 
in particular, fiscal rules can serve to deliver improved fiscal outcomes in politically fragmented 
environments. The view has been that fiscal rules can help lock in gains by introducing 
(quantitative) hard budget constraints, complementing sound institutional designs for budget 
management and a policy of transparency that responds to the demands of various constituencies. Page | 8  
 
A broader question is whether legislation establishing fiscal rules alone can substitute for 
inadequate institutions in highly fragmented political and institutional environments, by-passing 
the painful efforts of broader institution building in which fiscal rules would be one ingredient.  
II.  Fiscal Outcomes in the 2000s in Europe and Central Asia 
During 2005-07 ECA countries averaged a growth rate of 6.7% as compared with 5.2% 
during 2000-04 and 3.8% during 1995-2000.
2 While there was a great deal of variation among 
countries, (for example, Azerbaijan grew at 25% in 2007 versus Turkey at 4.7%), growth was 
higher than the average in half the countries during 05-07. Figures 1.1a and 1.1b below, show 
average growth rates during this period for all of ECA but also different groups in ECA. Growth 
in incomes reflected both large increases in investment, consumption and increasing integration 
in world markets.  
 
                                                 
2 All averages relative to GDP will be GDP weighted unless otherwise stated.  Unweighted  growth  rates  were 
7.8% overall, 15.2% for the OGE, 6.7 for the EU10+ and 7% for the LLMIC. Page | 9  
 
High GDP growth and increasing integration had substantial impacts on the fiscal 
position of ECA countries, the effect differing among countries depending on their initial 
conditions. For example, for the oil and gas exporters (OGE) fiscal developments are closely tied 
to world markets for oil and gas
3. Fast growing world markets meant high export values and high 
corporate profits. Fiscal revenues rose substantially. At the same time, in these economies the 
management of fiscal revenues from the oil and gas sectors has been of significant concern. The 
EU accession countries are distinguished by the nature of the fiscal and other structural reforms 
they have undertaken. This group which also has the higher income countries of the ECA region 
experienced a higher increase in trade integration than the other groups in the region. The graph 
EU10+ includes Croatia and Turkey in the group
4.  The decline in trade during the crisis affected 
tax receipts in many of the smaller countries substantially in the crisis. The low and lower middle 
                                                 
3  The oil and gas exporters are Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan. 
4  The UE10+ group is composed of:  Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia and Turkey. Page | 10  
 
income countries (LLMIC)
5 also had substantial growth in output and trade during the pre-2008 
period which had a positive impact on their fiscal outcomes, even though their fiscal institutions 
are less developed.  
 
 
III.  Rising Size of the Public Sector 
ECA countries’ fiscal situations improved dramatically alongside growth during 2000-07 
and the first half of 2008, in large part because of substantial fiscal revenue growth in their 
booming economies. During this period most countries also reformed tax policies and 
institutions. The reforms of tax policies aimed to reduce the tax burden on the private sector with 
the aim of supporting investment and growth but at the same time, reforms sought to broaden the 
tax base to maintain tax revenues. During this period, many countries also began reforms to 
                                                 
5  The LLMIC are:  Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine. Page | 11  
 
enhance the efficiency of expenditures and   to rationalize government spending. However, in the 
mid-2000s, some of the efforts appear to have weakened. 
From the early 2000s to 2007, real fiscal revenue growth in ECA was high and rising. As 
a share of GDP revenues were 33.6% during 1995-2000, and 32.5% during 2000-2004. As GDP 
accelerated, real fiscal revenue growth in ECA was high and rising and surpassed GDP growth in 
2005-07 to be 35.2% of GDP. As a ratio to GDP, revenues rose the most in the LLMIC group 
(outside of the oil related revenues accruing to the OGE), and the least in the EU+ countries, 
even though real growth was 7.5% in 2007 for this group. When averages are weighted by GDP 
however, the OGE revenue to GDP ratio is fairly constant (implying that in the larger countries, 
growth was slower), though the LLMIC come out stronger. Among the EU10 countries, the 
revenue share to GDP was fairly constant when weighted, but rose for the unweighted average as 
small countries experienced a rising share.  In countries where revenues followed patterns in 
imports, they would have exhibited more volatility relative to GDP. In 2007, 30% of ECA 
countries had real fiscal revenue growth above 10%
6: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Montenegro. Just under half the countries had real 
revenue growth over 10% in 2006, and 40% in 2005. By 2007, fiscal revenues to GDP were 
36.4%, though the OGE were at 39%- in weighted terms (Figures 3.1a and 3.1b).  
                                                 
6 The GDP deflator is used in calculating real values. Page | 12  
 
 




At the same time, average fiscal expenditures grew from just over 34.3% percent of GDP 
in 2000 to an average of 36.4% percent of GDP by 2007 though they fell in weighted terms until Page | 14  
 
2007.
7  There was a lot of variation among countries.  In fact, despite much higher GDP growth 
in the 2000s relative to the period 1995-2000, expenditures grew faster for many countries, 
though in GDP weighted terms, fiscal expenditures relative to GDP declined until 2007 for the 
EU10+ and OGE groups, but not for the LLMIC group. During 2006-07, average expenditure 
growth was more than 10% in real terms. Real expenditure growth was over 10% in 12 ECA 
countries in 2007 and in 9 countries in 2006. The period 2004-07 is distinguished by an 
acceleration in expenditure growth (see Figures 3a and 3b).    
IV.  The Impact of the Crisis 
Until the crisis struck, deficits and debt showed tremendous improvements in the 2000s. 
During 2000-03, the GDP weighted fiscal balance was a deficit of 3 percent of GDP on average. 
This reflected higher deficits in the EU10+group of over 6 % of GDP percent on average and in 
the LLMIC of 2 percent. The OGE had surpluses during this time. Due to impressive revenue 
performance, and strong growth, the debt to GDP ratios of ECA countries improved dramatically 
during 2000-07, the ECA (weighted) average falling from 46 percent of GDP to 23 percent of 
GDP. The decline was the largest in the LLMIC countries where debt/GDP fell by around 16 pp 
of GDP from 47 percent to 31 percent. The EU10+ group had smaller declines and was the most 
indebted in 2007. 
When the global economic crisis struck ECA countries in 2008, governments had already 
programmed large increases in expenditures and had to adopt revised budgets in 2008 that cut 
expenditures during the year in expectation of shortfalls in revenue. However, none of the ECA 
countries had declines in nominal expenditure levels (and only 6 had declines in real terms). 
                                                 
7 Note that all growth rates are given in unweighted terms.  Page | 15  
 
Though the crisis in 2008 had an immediate impact in many countries, 24 countries still had 
nominal expenditure growth of over 10 percent in 2008 (though only 10 saw growth in real terms 
at this rate) and 15 had growth over 20 percent (though only 1 had real growth at this rate). The 
adjustment is more visible when looking at expenditure to GDP ratios which fell (in terms of 
percentage points of GDP) in 11 countries in 2008 and 6 in 2009.  
  
A.   The crisis 
As a result of the changes in expenditures and revenues, in 2009, the average deficit for 
ECA rose by over 4 pp of GDP relative to 2008 and 6 pp of GDP relative to 2007. Seven 
countries had a deterioration of 5 pp or more. Russia and Kazakhstan stand out with very large 
deteriorations reflecting their large stimulus packages. But the largest deficits were in Latvia and 
Lithuania (9%) with Georgia and Romania following (8%) in 2009. Sixty percent of the 
countries with the largest deficits in 2009 (near 7% or above) had the highest share of taxes 
coming from VAT/taxes on goods and services.  
In order to manage their fiscal positions, ECA countries undertook a number of policies. 
There was a wide variation in responses, with some countries raising taxes, others lowering 
them, some running arrears and others reducing expenditures of various kinds. Some of the 
policies adopted are short term in nature and expected to be reversed (for example, lengthening 
the duration of unemployment compensation, or announcing temporary VAT cuts); others will 
need to be considered more carefully in the longer run (for example, the desired level and type of 
capital expenditures). The fiscal policies used are summarized in Table 1 below:  Page | 16  
 




Fiscal Policies In the Crisis Years 2008-09 
Wage Bill (Wage 
Growth/Employment) 
8 
Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine 
Pensions: Indexation change or oth
adjustment
9 
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan,  
Tax Cuts   Armenia, Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Ukraine 
Tax  Increases  Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine 
Financial Sector Measures
10  Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine 
Cuts in Capital Expenditures
11  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, 




Czech Republic, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Tajikistan 
Arrears  Owed to or by 
Government
13 
Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania, Russia, Tajikistan 
Employment/Unemployment 
Related Policies 
Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey 
Change in Subsidies to 
Enterprises/ Other 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan,  Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Ukraine 
Increase in Social Transfers
14  Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary (lowered), 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania (lowered), Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine 
                                                 
8 Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan had wage increases in 09.   The Czech Republic had a wage 
increase but employment reduction.   The others had declines in wages and/or employment.   Several countries had 
declines in general current expenditures as well.  
9 Russia, Tajikistan and Turkey had increases in 09. 
10 Does not cover central bank support of  various  kinds to the financial sector. 
11 These refer to cuts in 09.  Though countries may have begun adjusting at end 08, the overall numbers 
may or may not have shown adjustments.  
12 These refer to increases in 09.   Though countries may have begun adjusting at end 08, the overall 
numbers may or may not have shown adjustments. 
13 For Montenegro and Russia they were arrears owed to government. 
14 Some countries adopted policies to rationalize expenditures in the social sectors, e.g. eliminating free-of-
charge textbooks. These are not addressed here but are explained in the full country matrices. Page | 17  
 
Public Works  Armenia,  Bulgaria, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey 
 
Table 1 indicates that most governments had policies to contain the wage bill, and most 
had some sort of tax policy change during the crisis. Their efforts indicate that public sector 
compensation is (and will probably remain) an issue for budget management. Many countries 
used tax cuts to stimulate spending, but some had to increase taxes to offset the dramatic revenue 
declines or tax rate declines of previous years which took effect during the crisis years. Several 
supported their financial sectors and many governments took measures to help the unemployed 
and vulnerable.  
In sum, an analysis of the fiscal outcomes of the 2000s reveals that governments had 
substantially improved their fiscal positions in terms of reducing deficits and debt until the crisis 
struck in 2008. It also highlights how fiscal adjustment if measured in terms of deficits and debt, 
may be relatively painless under high growth rates.  The decline of 2008, however, illustrates the 
risk that volatile environments pose for fiscal outcomes. While governments were able to go on a 
spending spree in the mid 2000s, greater restraint would have meant lower deficits in the crisis. 
ECA countries adopted both expenditure and tax policies to (a) contain deficits or (b) boost 
aggregate demand or alternatively, (c) protect certain segments of the population. Many of the 
policies they adopted were short-term in nature (for example a freeze on wages) and would have 
been less necessary with more restraint. 
Any review of developments in the ECA region in the pre-crisis years and extensive 
efforts to contain budgets in the crisis years would be incomplete without some assessment of the 
institutional changes that were taking place in these countries as fiscal outcomes improved in the 
2000s. The next section describes some of these important changes in ECA’s fiscal institutions 
and the following section examines the impact of institutional changes in three countries.  Page | 18  
 
 
V.  Fiscal Institutional Reforms: A Bird’s Eye View
15 
The design, reform or creation of fiscal institutions has been a major challenge for 
transition economies where defining the boundaries of the state has been and remains a 
continuing challenge.  The point of departure in the reform process across countries differed 
substantially depending on the length of time each country spent under socialism and the type of 
socialism it practiced. All countries faced severe political and institutional fragmentation, which 
led to the emergence of soft-budget constraints with noted fiscal consequences that delayed the 
transition process (Kornai et al. (2003), World Bank 2002) The efforts to address these 
challenges included the corporatization of productive and financial enterprises and their 
privatization as well as setting the institutional frameworks for social security, and introducing 
fiscal systems for local and regional governments. The fiscal institutional building agenda 
focused on fundamentals, such as taxation, accounting, treasury and the establishment of 
budgetary procedures. These changes have happened in a fluid and fragmented political 
situation.  Not surprisingly, design and implementation of these agendas has taken time and 
proceeded in spurts often linked to external events. The efforts by transition economies to close 
institutional gaps that existed with respect to market economies provide valuable experimental 
information on the process of change and the role of fiscal institutions in reducing fragmentation 
and increasing transparency, the importance of political fragmentation, and the contribution of 
economic events.  
                                                 
15 This section is drawn from “Fiscal Institutions in ECA countries” Eckhardt and Islam (2010) draft. Page | 19  
 
As discussed, the 2000s, particularly the latter half, saw high growth rates and improving 
fiscal positions. During this time ECA countries were very outward focused integrating with 
global markets.  Higher integration meant also that changes in the external environment became 
very important for fiscal policies and outcomes. Many countries acceded to the EU adopting EU 
reforms, while other countries saw change to various degrees. The crisis of the late 2000s 
brought certain weaknesses in fiscal management to the forefront of policy discussion during this 
period of fiscal adjustment. The 2008/09 crisis tested the readiness of some of the institutions 
ECA countries had put in place and highlighted areas in which countries need to move forward.  
Most countries in the ECA region have made progress in reforming their fiscal 
institutions, but the pace of institutional change has been uneven. The World Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) attempt to measure the quality of policy and 
institutions in member countries in a number of areas. These assessments are based on both 
quantitative, monitorable indicators of policy and institutional reform, as well as judgments by 
country teams.
16 One of the indicators considered relates to the quality of public administration. 
Its evolution suggests that the majority of countries have made some progress over the past 
decade, and while some countries seem to have stagnated, none of the countries seems to have 
experienced a major deterioration in institutional quality. However, the quality of fiscal systems 
continues to differ across the region with differences in income levels. Figure 4 below shows the 
evolution of the CPIA indicator for ECA countries separated into three groups according to GDP 
per capita. The top third in terms of income per capita have much higher scores as might be 
expected, but countries at the lower and middle income categories have also been improving. 
                                                 
16 Countries are rated on a score of 1 to 6. Page | 20  
 
Variance in institutional quality for a given level of income is greater among lower and middle 
income countries, while it converges among the high income countries.  
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The first part of the decade saw the largest change in institutional quality for all groups as 
Figure 5 shows. The middle group had the greatest improvements, followed by the countries in 
the bottom third income group.  In the second half of the decade, the rate of change in 
institutional improvement was stronger in the lowest income group among the ECA countries. 
Despite these changes in the second and third tier income groups, the top countries in terms of 
per capita income have much better quality of institutions. 
Overall in ECA, the fiscal reform agenda has evolved over the last decade. The first 
decade of transition (1990-2000) was dominated by institutional changes designed to overcome 
the legacy of central planning systems. During this time, reforms included the establishment of 
treasuries to improve the execution of the budget and cash management, the gradual integration 
of off-budgetary funds, the clarification of roles and responsibilities of different institutions in 
the budget process, establishment of democratic checks and balances, such as legislative budget 
approval and establishment of external audit institutions. There were major fiscal consolidation 
efforts in many countries of the region. Many countries put in place fundamental financial 
management regulations through the adoption of organic budget and treasury laws.  
With the most basic fiscal management foundations in place, the reform agenda during 
the second decade (2000-2010) has moved to tackle more advanced challenges, such as linking 
expenditure prioritization more closely to policy objectives, introduction of a medium term 
perspective in fiscal policy, mostly through the adoption of Medium Term Expenditure 
Frameworks (MTEF) and a move away from detailed input controls to more performance and 
results orientation in expenditure management. Most countries in the region have some form of 
MTEF with differing degrees of integration with the budget process. Armenia‘s MTEF for 
example, is an integral part of the budgetary process. In Croatia, the MTEFs are formally Page | 22  
 
adopted by Parliament. In addition, countries have begun adopting various kinds of fiscal rules to 
contain budgets and public debt (the EU accession countries have supranational rules under the 
convergence programs which limit debt and deficit ratios to GDP). Tax administration reforms 
have also advanced and many countries have begun to adopt practices compliant with the 
principles of self-assessment, better risk management, simplicity, greater transparency, client 
segmentation and specialization aimed at reducing compliance burden and administrative costs.  
In addition, along with the democratization of political systems across the region, 
parliaments have taken on strong oversight roles in the budget process in most countries. 
Legislative scrutiny and enactment of annual budget laws is an essential element supporting 
government accountability. This type of scrutiny is intended to provide both an institutional 
check on executive power and voice to public demands. As the role of legislatures has grown 
budget decisions have become more transparent across ECA countries. This was particularly 
important during the recent crisis when many governments had to undertake budget 
amendments and difficult budgetary decisions.  
The specific role of Parliaments and the authority they enjoy vary across countries, and 
depend to a great extent on the constitutional traditions of a country. Some legislatures have 
virtually unlimited powers to amend and change executive budget proposals, including changes 
that affect the Government’s overall fiscal stance. In other countries, parliamentary powers over 
the budget are constrained to only effecting expenditure re-allocations in the initial deficit target 
set by the executive. For example, in Croatia the 2003 Organic Budget Law and a subsequent 
version passed in 2008 requires that any amendment proposal needs to identify an offsetting 
measure to remain deficit neutral. Several different types of arrangements may be consistent with 
fiscal discipline, depending on the existence of other constraints faced by the executive and Page | 23  
 
legislative arms of government. However, unlimited budgetary amendment powers require that 
constraints on fiscal expansion do exist in the budget review process to restrain elected 
representatives from overspending. Parliaments in ECA enjoy amendment powers of various 
types. Among those parliaments with unlimited amendment powers are those of Albania and 
Romania. Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Turkey are among those with limited amendment 
powers while the parliaments of Georgia and Azerbaijan do not enjoy formal amendment 
powers. 
While there are common themes, such as policy based budgeting, performance 
orientation and medium term fiscal planning, fiscal reform challenges and priorities have varied 
across the region depending on the structure of the economy and other country characteristics. 
For example, the key fiscal policy and institutional challenge for oil and commodity exporters, 
like Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan was related to the prudent management of large revenue 
windfalls that have accrued over the past decade. For the new member states of the EU, reforms 
were driven by requirements of the accession process, including adoption of the SGP fiscal rules 
and fiduciary systems capable of managing and absorbing increasing transfers from the EU 
under the common agricultural policy and structural funds. In contrast, in some of the lower 
income countries the focus has remained on building the foundations for sustainable fiscal 
management with a focus on both reforms of revenue administrations to broaden tax bases and 
stabilize revenue generation and systems for prudent expenditure control. Below, we look at two 
institutional reforms aimed at supporting fiscal discipline, in more detail. 
VI.  Fiscal Rules  
As mentioned in Part I, The basic rationale for fiscal rules is to create a mutually binding 
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time and/or different budgetary entities. Pre-established fiscal rules are particularly useful in 
settings characterized by multiple constituencies with the ability to initiate spending and revenue 
policies. If properly designed, a rules based approach can help secure control over consolidated 
fiscal balances while allowing a prudent degree of flexibility to entity governments. Numerical 
fiscal rules can apply to all fiscal aggregates: expenditure, the deficit, the debt stock, and revenue 
(although there are few practical examples).  
The proliferation of fiscal rules across the ECA region is a relatively new trend. About 
half of the countries in the region have adopted fiscal rules, mostly during the past ten years. The 
types of fiscal rules they have adopted vary greatly among ECA countries. The new EU member 
states all comply with the EU stability and growth pact, but only a few have embedded the 
supranational rules in their national fiscal-institutional framework. In other countries fiscal rules 
have been included in organic budget laws or specific debt management and fiscal responsibility 
laws while others have promulgated fiscal targets either as part of their Medium Term 
Expenditure Frameworks or as general political commitments. Deficit and debt rules are by far 
the most popular type of rules among ECA countries. All EU member states are committed to the 
deficit and debt rule of the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition, Hungary, adopted a deficit 
rule requiring the general government primary budget balance be in surplus. Armenia’s debt 
management law passed in 2008 establishes an overall constraint on public debt at 60 percent of 
GDP and an additional limitation on the annual budget balance when debt is above 50 percent of 
GDP.  
As countries are faced with pressures emanating from the recent crisis, they have often 
exceeded constraints established by their fiscal rules.  In the recent crisis, fiscal rules, in 
particular those constraining deficits, have been criticized for reinforcing pro-cyclical fiscal Page | 25  
 
policy. Many countries have chosen to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy stance in reaction to 
the economic downturn, sometimes at the cost of exceeding pre-established deficit limits.  
VII.  Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks 
Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) are tools which aim to introduce a 
more strategic approach to budget formulation and help focus on fiscal priorities with a medium- 
to long- term perspective.  MTEFs typically comprise top down estimates  of the expected 
aggregate resource envelope, bottom up forward estimates of expenditures required to continue 
existing policy commitments and a framework to reconcile the two. Fully elaborated MTEFs 
translate the government’s macroeconomic and fiscal strategy into budgetary policy. MTEFs can 
help safeguard fiscal sustainability by projecting the fiscal impact of current budget decisions, 
including the recurrent cost implications of capital expenditures and the available resource 
envelope over the medium term and by enhancing transparency. For MTEFs to be effective tools 
for expenditure prioritization and budgetary decision-making they need to be procedurally and 
institutionally integrated with the annual budget formulation process. In practice, countries rarely 
adopt fully articulated MTEFs, but selectively and/or sequentially apply key elements.  
Almost all ECA countries (26 of the 28 examined) are now experimenting with some 
form of medium-term budgeting. Most of the medium-term frameworks cover a three or four-
year period. But the depth of medium-term planning and its impact on budgetary decisions vary 
across countries. Some countries prepare only forward estimates of fiscal aggregates (revenue, 
and broad expenditure categories) while others have developed full-fledged MTEFs with detailed 
bottom up expenditure estimates for existing programs as well as forward looking estimates.. 
The institutional coverage varies but many countries continue to cover only central government 
operations, though sub-national governments are included in the MTEFs of only a few countries, Page | 26  
 
such as Armenia. In a majority of countries the institutional and procedural integration of 
MTEFs with the annual budget process is incomplete, undermining their real impact on 
expenditure prioritization. Only in some countries, like Croatia, Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic are MTEFs formally adopted by Parliament; others adopt MTEFs as executive 
documents.  A number of countries, including Armenia, Moldova and Russia have suspended the 
preparation of MTEFs in view of the recent volatility in the macro-economic environment. 
Economic volatility has thrown into uncertainty growth and revenue prospects, the costs 
associated with financing the deficit on world markets as well as expenditure needs arising from 
automatic stabilization.  
VIII.  Three Countries: How Fiscal Institutions Performed in 
Russia, Turkey, and Poland 
  In this section, we (a) examine the evolution of fiscal institutions during the 1990s and 
2000s in Russia, Poland and Turkey in some detail; (b) discuss how these institutions and the 
degree of political fragmentation may have affected fiscal outcomes in the last decade; and (c) 
discuss how the latter in turn has affected institutional development.   
The general developments in fiscal outcomes in ECA countries are reflected in the public 
sector outturns of Poland, Russia and Turkey during 2000-2010. Turkey’s fiscal adjustment, as 
shown by its dramatic reduction in the deficit was particularly remarkable in the aftermath of the 
crisis in 2001 to 2006 (Figure 6). Poland’s deficit also falls continuously during 2003-2007 and 
Russia’s surpluses of the mid- 2000s are impressive. Turkey’s performance is the most 
impressive in containing the share of government in GDP: in Turkey, outlays to GDP fell 
continuously from 30.8 to 23.7 in 2006 (rising slightly in 2007), This was also true of Russia Page | 27  
 
(outlays fell from 38.3 percent to 31.6 percent in 2006 but rose 2.6 percentage points of GDP in 
2007 as the government boosted spending just before the crisis (Figure 7). Expenditures to GDP 
fell less in Poland (44.7 to 42.2 percent in 2007) and the changes fluctuated in the period with 
some years seeing expenditures grow faster than GDP. The impact of the growth downturns in 
2008 meant large deteriorations in the deficit for all countries as fiscal revenues fell (Figure 8). 
Also, all three countries protected expenditures during the growth collapse, Russia leading with a 
large stimulus package. In Turkey and Poland, debt to GDP rose while Russia used its oil 
reserves.  
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The three countries had very different institutional conditions at the beginning of the 90s 
many of which were maintained till the early 2000s. Poland and Russia, the “transition 
economies” changed their institutions to more market-oriented ones but with different points of 
departure. In the early 1990s, Poland’s institutional framework was closer to market principles 
because market supporting structures had been in place before WWII and the transition process 
began in Poland earlier than in Russia. Russia in contrast, experienced a more centralized form 
of socialism and for a longer period, so that when the transition began the gap with market 
supporting institutions was larger than that in Poland. Overall Russia’s challenge compares with 
the challenge of other CIS countries that had a similar point of departure. Turkey was not a 
transition economy in the traditional sense but rather made a transition from a long-period of 




The Magdalenka Agreement of early 1989 in Poland (alternatively referred to as the 
Roundtable Negotiations), concluded negotiations between the incumbent communists and the 
opposition, thus setting the basis for new, democratic institutions. Building on strong popular 
support, the Government of Prime Minister Mazowiecki undertook wholesale reform combining 
macroeconomic stabilization with comprehensive institutional reform and the government put 
fiscal reform at the center of its agenda. Through a combination of expenditure cuts and revenue 
increases, it narrowed the fiscal gap; the headline deficit decreased from 8.5% of GDP in 1991 to 
4.3% of GDP in 1998 and 2.3% of GDP in 1999.  Other reforms, such as privatization and 
regulation to harden budget constraints focused on clarifying the boundaries of the state. 
    After a severe economic contraction in 1991, rapid economic growth and 
macroeconomic stabilization made Poland one of the leaders of the early transition period. In 
1991, parliament approved the first comprehensive public finance law (Budget Law) that 
adjusted fiscal institutions to the new market economy regime. Later, the 1997 Constitution 
mandated restrictions on the level of the national debt, banned financing of the deficit by the 
Central Bank, empowered parliament to introduce changes to the draft of the State Budget and 
mandated parliament to pass a new comprehensive legal act on public finance. The constitutional 
rules on public debt stipulated maintaining (i) the outstanding central government public debt 
below 60 percent of GDP and the (ii) the ratio of debt service to revenues for local governments 
below 15 percent. The Public Finance Act that became effective January 1, 1999 mandated 
specific actions in the case that public debt moved close to 60 percent of GDP. In addition, it laid 
out the framework governing the coverage of the budget, the roles of the budgetary units Page | 30  
 
(departments and agencies), the procedures at the central and the local level of government and 
the submission of the budget to the parliament, among related aspects. The fiscal rules gave the 
legislature powers to revise and alter revenue estimates and expenditure programs as long as it 
maintained the government-proposed nominal deficit levels. The President maintained the power 
to veto the budget proposed by the legislature. The legislation confirmed an independent audit 
agency, known as the Supreme Chamber.  On availability of information, the Constitution and 
the Public Finance Act defined with precision the required scope and dates of publishing core 
fiscal information.  
Political and institutional fragmentation still remained issues and their effects on the 
budget were aggravated by the lack of a single treasury account where budget units would 
maintain sub-accounts within a consolidated budget.
17 In addition, EU programs and projects 
were not included in budgetary estimates of expenditures or financing and thus were not part of 
the appropriation process of the legislature, although counterpart allocations, met from local 
sources, were included in the budget (albeit separately appropriated.) Upon Poland joining the 
EU in 2004, additional fiscal rules became mandatory and greater fiscal transparency was 
required. The 3 percent of GDP ceiling on the fiscal deficit under the Growth and Stability Pact 
complemented Poland’s rules on public debt. Amendments to the Act on Public Finances in 2001 
and 2003 to comply with the acquis communitaire meant an additional strengthening of the 1998 
fiscal reform efforts. Yet, all these reforms did not succeed in reducing fragmentation. A review 
by Von Hagen (2006) stressed that the authority of the Ministry of Finance within the cabinet 
and in relationship to Parliament faced constraints. Namely, the full cabinet had the power to 
                                                 
17 WB OER 2003. Note however, that the lack of a single treasury account  probably itself reflected a lack 
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override the Ministry of Finance and Parliament to make substantial modifications to the budget. 
Von Hagen pointed to how the fragmented political system at the time was an additional source 
of incoherence that affected the design of fiscal institutions. After reaching a peak of 6.7 percent 
growth of GDP in 1997, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis economic growth in Poland slowed 
in the early 2000s. At the same time, the public sector deficit jumped from 3.4 percent of GDP in 
2000 to 5.9 percent of GDP in 2004, driven by increases in transfers and subsidies, with the 
public debt to GDP rising from 37.6 in 2001 to around 47.1 percent in 2005.  Despite Poland’s 
significant reforms, fiscal consolidation failed in the face of fragmented politics. Public 
expenditures remained high and social transfers (whose share of GDP continued to increase) 
much higher than other countries in the region with similar incomes per capita.  
But, the booming external environment supported Poland’s economic and fiscal recovery 
around the mid-2000s. However, the economic situation did not galvanize the authorities into 
action on expenditure rationalization. As growth eased the debt burden, fiscal rules and 
constraints were not binding- the debt/GDP ratio came down to 44.8% by 2007. Fiscal 
improvements allowing consolidation of EU funds into the budget and the incorporation of extra-
budgetary funds were implemented. Most importantly, in late 2007, a new government with 
parliamentary majority came to power and moved forward reforms that began to  address points 
of fiscal weakness—pensions, taxes and social security contributions. These reform initiatives 
were launched before the crisis and were grounded partly (i.e. reduction in social security 
contribution) in the buoyant public revenues at the time.     Poland’s fiscal improvements were 
substantially affected by the general economic reforms. Fiscal institutions did not contain 
expenditure growth.                                                                                                                                                    Page | 32  
 
When the global crisis struck in 2008, Poland undertook some fiscal expansion. Poland’s 
economy suffered less than many others in the region, with the more moderate dependence on 
the external sector softening the impact of the external crisis. The government borrowed 
externally from international capital markets and official donors and undertook further 
expenditure rationalization, while providing support to the economy. The IMF estimates that the 
country provided significant fiscal stimulus during the crisis, with a discretionary fiscal 
relaxation estimated at 1.15 percent of GDP in 2008 and 2.5 percent of GDP in 2009, in part 
resulting from tax cuts that were approved prior to the crisis and not compensated by budget cuts 
as initially intended in 2009.  The increase in the fiscal deficit from 2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 
7 percent of GDP in 2009 reversed the trend in place since 2000. The excessive deficit procedure 
under the SGP was initiated in 2008 due to the deficit overrun. 
18 As a consequence public debt 
escalated from 45 percent of GDP in 2007 to an estimated 51 percent in 2009.   
 Overall expenditure control remains relatively weak. The 2010 Bank Public Expenditure 
Review
19 (PER) stressed the need to better align budgetary allocations within a mid-term 
consistent framework, a point that the 2003 PER had stressed but where apparently progress had 
been limited.  Some MTEF elements were introduced with the new Law on Public Finance of 
2009 and the first adoption of the Medium-Term Financial Plan of the State in late July 2010. 
Despite the national and supra-national rules and reforms in tax administration, Poland could not 
contain its deficit or debt to GDP ratios. Fiscal rules could not substitute for political 
fragmentation and were not useful in a crisis. 
                                                 
18  In 2009, despite a preparation to reduce state expenditures by 10 percent, state related expenditures, 
excluding EU-related spending, increased by 20 percent in current prices during the first half of the year, but the 
July supplementary budget changed the 2009 to cut expenditures helping contain the general budget deficit to about 
6 percent of GDP.  
19 Public Expenditure Reviews by the World Banks assess the fiscal policy and institutions, particularly as 
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The fiscal situation in 2009 led the government to revise the Public Finance Act to 
strengthen commitment to (a) a level of public debt lower than 60 percent of GDP, (b) a medium 
term framework for the planning of public expenditure; (c) introduction of performance-based 
budgeting; (d) further consolidation of government (reducing fragmentation); (e) stronger control 
and internal audit, and (f) separation of EU funds from other items in the state budget. The 
revised Public Finance Act strengthens the previous safety thresholds and requires additional 
corrective actions if the debt exceeds 55 percent of GDP.  
For Poland’s expenditure-based adjustment to succeed, the country needs to address the 
political and economic fragmentation that has put upward pressure on expenditures and delayed 
fiscal adjustments. Recent legal initiatives, including the revision of the Public Finance Act and 
the reform of social security, could ease such pressures; the latter will reduce the fiscal risk that 
could arise from the growing elderly population. Going forward, Poland’s fiscal consolidation 
strategy includes plans for two new fiscal rules: (a) to limit the growth in discretionary budgetary 
spending to 1 percent over inflation over the next few years; and (b) over the longer-run, 
introduce a fiscal rule through a new public financial stability law to prevent a pro-cyclical fiscal 
pattern in public finances.  The institutional reforms that commenced in 1998 need to be 
strengthened to contain political fragmentation, recent legislation reduces institutional 
fragmentation but does not strengthen the powers of the fiscal authorities or constrain 
parliamentary powers to revise the budget. Lacking strong fiscal powers the authorities may find 
it difficult to enforce (top-down) fiscal envelopes for the whole public sector.  
B.  Russia 
After the transition began in 1991, the building of fiscal institutions in Russia proceeded 
slowly. A highly fragmented fiscal system emerged; Federal Government expenditures were less Page | 34  
 
than half of total public expenditures with the rest accounted for by the sub-national 
governments.  The fragmented fiscal structure meant fiscal outcomes were hard to contain 
placing the country in a weak position as it faced the 1998 crisis. In the pre-1998 period 
weaknesses in tax policy, tax administration and budgetary management reinforced each other. 
The lack of adequate expenditure control and the inability to collect revenues meant the 
authorities used noncash mechanisms to settle budgetary commitments. They accumulated 
arrears. In fact, ad-hoc expenditure cuts and budgetary arrears became pervasive at all levels, 
including in extra-budgetary funds and sub-national governments. The Federal Government 
accounted for the bulk of the overall public deficit (expenditures were pushed up by rising 
transfers and interest payments); its fiscal space was shrinking as revenues were declining (from 
15.6 percent of GDP in 1992 to 11.6 percent in 1997). In response, the Federal Government tried 
to control the deficit by cutting expenditure (from 26 percent of GDP to 18.4 percent) but did so 
in an ad-hoc manner. Russia’s fragmented political system blocked efforts at fiscal reform; for 
instance the Duma rejected a fiscal reform package in July 1998 just before the financial crisis 
hit.   
During the crisis, the economy contracted and the debt to GDP ratio reached over 90 in 
1999. With a new government in place, the authorities undertook a dramatic shift in fiscal and 
macroeconomic policy, and by 2002 the general government was running a surplus which it 
maintained until the crisis of 2008-09.  But, the financial crisis of 1998 was clearly a watershed 
event for Russia’s fiscal institutions and fiscal performance and it led to a turnaround among 
politicians and technocrats. The cooperation between the executive and the Duma increased, 
beginning with the approval of a tough 1999 budget that included significant reductions in 
expenditure including at the regional and the local levels. Changes went beyond the approval of Page | 35  
 
tight and demanding budgets. The government abandoned the practice of using tax offsets to pay 
its obligations and this helped foster revenue mobilization and reduced barter transactions in the 
economy.  In addition, control over regional and local government finances increased, as did the 
share of taxes channeled through the federal budget. From 2000 to 2005, the authorities 
overhauled fiscal institutions in several core strategic areas beginning with the reform of the tax 
system, including the adoption of a flat income tax and reduction in the corporate income tax 
rate. Tax administration reforms efforts complemented tax policy initiatives. In 2002, a single 
Treasury Account brought all government expenditures together at the Central Bank. The 
revision of the budget code laid out sound principles for budget preparation, execution and 
reporting covered the sub national governments and established limits on their deficits and 
borrowing capacity.   In a significant step, the government undertook to manage its oil revenues 
better and introduced an Oil Stabilization Fund (created in 2003 and operational in 2004); later in 
2008 this Fund would be split in two:  (a) a Reserve Fund (aiming to insure against price 
volatility) and (b) a National Welfare Fund (for inter-generational equity.)    
There were questions however about the sustainability of the adjustment because it 
initially held social payments and wages below inflation. However, as the finances of the public 
sector improved, aided by increases in oil revenues which by 2000 had already reached 7.5 
percent of GDP- concurrently, expenditures rose and the non-oil fiscal deficit to non-oil GDP 
that had reached a surplus in 2000 became a growing deficit thereafter. This development 
however did not impair a rapid reduction of the overall public debt, a reduction that was aided by 
the rapid growth in oil export revenues, non-oil revenues to GDP, and negative real interest rates.  
The reform of the fiscal relationship across the levels of government proceeded 
gradually, beginning with the passing in 2003 of a comprehensive decentralization reform that Page | 36  
 
radically reshaped the powers of the local governments in Russia. This legislation was enacted in 
2006 and full implementation commenced in January 2009. In addition, the 2004 Budget Code 
and the 2004 Federal Law on the Distribution and Assignments between Levels of Government 
tightened the assignment of spending mandates. Federal grants to regions came under common 
rules that limited them to equalization, matching and compensation for federal mandates. The 
use of formulae for equalization transfers as mandated by the Budget Code has replaced previous 
negotiations between the Federal Government and the regions. The legislation endeavored to 
clarify over-lapping responsibilities between the Federal government and the regions, to 
eliminate unfunded mandates and to reduce excessive expenditure obligations.  
Despite buoyant public sector revenues, fiscal institutional reform continued and focused 
on second generation reforms that included the introduction of multi-year and performance 
budgeting (2007), that allowed line ministries to conclude multi-annual contracts and  distinguish 
between the baseline budget and new budget initiatives. The need to respond to the crisis in late 
2008, however, led to a suspension of the first multiyear budget adopted in 2007. Further 
revisions to the Budget code in 2007 tightened the fiscal rules and increased the constraints on 
extra-budgetary activities of government units and public enterprises, which was complemented 
with efforts to terminate quasi-fiscal spending by public corporations in which the Russia 
Federation holds a stake.   
As a result of all these reform, Russia’s fiscal institutions and fiscal performance 
improved vastly during the 2000-2008 period.  These improvements meant that Russia entered 
the 2008-09 recession in a fiscally strong period, with a large government surplus, a low public 
debt and sizeable fiscal reserves. In the last quarter of 2008, when the effects of the global crisis 
were beginning to be felt in Russia, the government responded with an array of policies. Russia’s Page | 37  
 
total stimulus package of about 6.7% of GDP over 08-09 was large when compared to that of 
other countries. The across-the-board institutional overhaul that took place in the decade after 
1998 to addressing the crisis in 2008 and 2009 allowed the government to respond boldly using 
the room to maneuver created by the substantial level of reserves and the low public debt.  As a 
result, the non-oil federal deficit reached 13.5 percent of GDP in 2009, and is likely to remain at 
a similar level in 2010. At the same time, it is estimated that a long-term sustainable level for the 
deficit is around 4.3 percent of GDP. The gap between this number and the current deficit 
implies the magnitude of the adjustment faced by Russia. (Bogetic et al. 2010).  
Recent spending increases in Russia (which began before the crisis) reflect permanent 
shifts (in pension and wages, for instance) in a situation where long-term sustainability calls for a 
significant reduction in the non-oil deficit. The Reserve Fund has been depleted substantially but 
less than had been feared at the beginning of the crisis. Thus Russia, like Poland, faces 
significant challenges ahead in further consolidation of its budget. The institutional apparatus, set 
in place before the crisis, with emphasis on embedding the budget within a mid-term framework 
can serve to help maneuver the needed adjustment, but it will have to be anchored on a broad 
political consensus to increase the likelihood of sustainability. The adoption of new rules on oil 
revenues may signal a greater commitment to fiscal constraint. 
C.  Turkey 
The opening and liberalization of the Turkish economy began in 1980 as the country 
started abandoning strict import-substitution policies. For the next two decades (1980-1999) 
Turkey faced periodic crises which combined stop and go cycles of growth and a rising level of 
average inflation. But efforts at fiscal adjustment did not take hold. Fiscal and political 
fragmentation was at the heart of the macroeconomic difficulties. For instance, two episodes Page | 38  
 
during the 1990s (1994-1995 and 1998) increased the overall primary surplus of the central 
government through substantive reductions in expenditures and tax increases, but could not 
contain the deficit in the rest of the public sector. With the adjustment burden falling on the 
central government and with a private sector with limited appetite to pay more taxes, the efforts 
failed. The relative autonomy of various segments of the public sector reduced the fiscal space 
available to the center and its ability to manage the overall fiscal situation, leading to periodic 
increases in the overall public sector deficit, inflation and the public sector debt. In addition, 
underlying these two failed fiscal adjustments during the 1990s were weak coalition 
governments that could not implement the changes needed to impose hard budget constraints on 
the rest of the public sector.  By 1999, the public sector debt as a percentage of GDP had grown 
to 61 percent from 35 percent at the beginning of the decade. Meanwhile the ratio of taxes to 
GDP remained relatively stable, despite a decade of efforts at tax policy and tax administration 
reform. 
In 1999, in the wake of the Russian crisis, an adjustment effort supported by an IMF 
program focused on curtailing the fiscal powers of the non-central public agencies and 
enterprises. But, in 2000, the high level of short-term debt refinancing obligations of the public 
sector induced a fiscal/financial crisis that compromised a weak banking sector. Political and 
fiscal fragmentation led to a high level of spending and correspondingly large deficits financed 
by captive public banks. The situation was aggravated by the crawling peg established in 1999 
which led the banks to make exchange rate “bets” they lost when the peg failed.  Turkey faced 
one of its most severe crises in 2001.  The crisis galvanized the authorities into action.  They 
ruled out debt restructuring and focused instead on ensuring the ability to roll over debt and 
strengthen longer term sustainability through the generation of high primary surpluses.  A critical Page | 39  
 
part of the adjustment was to generate a primary surplus in the rest of the public sector.  The 
adjustment relied as well on indirect taxes (VAT, special consumption tax, petroleum, tobacco, 
alcohol and motor vehicles) with a lesser contribution of personal and corporate income taxes.  
Deep structural reforms accompanied the program with a primary focus on the banking sector. 
Costs of bank restructuring amounted to about 15 of GDP. Turkey obtained sizeable multilateral 
and bilateral financial support complemented the high primary fiscal surplus to service and 
manage the debt bulge and to assure the continued availability of international finance. It took 
longer to reduce the vulnerability of the high level of debt, which was also relatively short-term. 
In contrast to previous efforts the rest-of-of the-public sector primary balance went from deficit 
to surplus for the first time since 1980. GDP did contract by 5.7% percent in 2001, but rapid 
recovery followed in 2002 and GDP grew by 6.2% followed by 5.3% in 2003.  
Although the adjustment was undertaken under a coalition government the 2002 election 
brought in a single party government with an overall majority that went on to conclude the 
stabilization process and soon thereafter launched an overhaul of its fiscal institutions that the 
Public Financial Management Control Law (PFMC Law), effective in 2006, consolidated. The 
PFMC Law reformed the entire cycle from planning and budgeting to legislative scrutiny of 
budget proposals, internal control and audit, external audit and ex-post legislative control. The 
PFMC Law advanced a more consolidated view of the General Government to include Central 
Government, Social Security Institutions, and Local Administrations. In addition, it assigned 
responsibilities to a small set of core agencies, reducing fragmentation in decision making: the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the (Undersecretariat of 
the) Treasury. The MOF prepares, executes and reports on the budget; SPO prepares the macro-
framework, which us then sued by the Treasury to develop the investment budget and manage Page | 40  
 
the public debt (and cash flow). The MOF sets tax policy but a specialized agency (Revenue 
Administration) collects.  
During 2003-06, the nonfinancial public sector primary balance was in surplus as was the 
central government and the rest of the public sector.  The period saw a rapid decline in the public 
sector debt relative to the economy. Turkey was helped by rapid growth. The general 
government gross debt to GDP ratio fell from 78.6% of GDP in 2001 to 39.5% of GDP in 2008.  
By the last quarter of 2008, the he global crisis had affected Turkey. The authorities undertook a 
fiscal expansion in response to the crisis. The public sector primary fiscal balance went from a 
surplus of 4.1 percent of GDP in 2007 to a surplus of 3.4 percent in 2008 to balance in 2009. The 
decline in the primary fiscal balance was due to discretionary measures which amounted to 1.2 
percent of GDP with the remainder coming from automatic fiscal stabilizers. These came mostly 
as transfers to the health and social security systems. In addition the government introduced 
temporary tax cuts (VAT) to induce consumption of durables; a moderate package of 
employment support measures would be introduced as unemployment increased.  
The ability of the government to respond was certainly aided by the fiscal space that had 
been gained and the low level of public debt. Yet as the crisis recedes, Turkey will need to 
ensure budgetary prudence and to further strengthen its fiscal institutions. To lock in gains and 
guide the future fiscal stance, the government has proposed adopting a fiscal rule. Draft fiscal 
legislation sets an annual deficit ceiling that adjusts to cyclical conditions while converging 
gradually to the medium-term deficit target. The draft legislation also proposes important 
improvements to Turkey’s public financial management procedures, including more transparent 
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government borrowing, and strengthened controls to deliver spending outturns more in line with 
the budget. Recent announcements indicate that the adoption of the rule may be delayed. 
Conclusion 
ECA countries, including the three countries studied in some detail, saw improvements in 
the quality of fiscal institutions and in fiscal outcomes during the period under study. The 
improvements in fiscal outcomes before the crisis were aided substantially by a favorable 
international environment but also by improved fiscal institutions that reduced institutional 
fragmentation and enhanced transparency through significant investment in supporting systems. 
Political consensus (or lack thereof) has been a major determining factor behind the types of 
institutional progress and fiscal consolidation that has taken place. Periods of political 
consolidation have favored institutional improvements. In addition, the impetus for institutional 
reforms has gained momentum after the recent crisis.  
At the eve of the economic crisis, the three countries seemed better prepared in terms of 
their fiscal accounts, than in the earlier 1998 crisis period. By 2007, they had all reduced their 
public debt to GDP ratios and improved primary fiscal balances. But large increases in tax 
revenues and GDP allowed expenditures to accelerate though the deficit fell: fiscal controls did 
not extend as well as they could have to expenditures. Neither was there substantial improvement 
in problems areas or rationalization of expenditure patterns. Russia had accumulated substantial 
international reserves from oil exports by 2007 but it succumbed to upward pressures on 
expenditures.  Russia’s high reserves saw it through the crisis, but the time is ripe for a more 
critical look at public sector expenditures and further constraints on the use of the oil fund. 
Turkey’s expenditure cuts were remarkable until the latter half of the 2000s but Turkey can Page | 42  
 
reduce its risks further through a more complete consolidation of the public sector finances and a 
renewed commitment to expenditure rationalization. Among the three, Poland, which also raised 
expenditures, is the only one that had a rise in the public debt to GDP ratio before the crisis, and 
this happened despite the multiplicity of rules and constraints it adopted in the EU accession 
process. For a variety of reasons, Poland weathered the crisis better, but its fiscal accounts 
continue to be endangered by rising debt. A political will to tackle social expenditures is critical 
to Poland’s ability to further contain its fiscal outcomes. It is difficult to assess the impact of the 
institutional reforms in the crisis itself. The empirical evidence indicates that improved 
institutional frameworks were no match for the unprecedented swings in the macroeconomics in 
the region, but countries were able to maneuver more efficiently and decisively than in previous 
episodes in the last two decades.  
Over the longer term, the crisis is likely to have two impacts. First, longstanding reforms 
in social programs, which had lost momentum due to the easy financing of the 2000s, are now 
more likely to be re-enacted, and lead to more sustainable public finances in the future.  Second, 
the momentum for more binding fiscal rules is gaining strength, this time accompanied by 
substantial improvements in the underlying institutional capacity to enforce them. The principal 
weakness looking forward, of course, remains the unpredictability of the political process. Page | 43  
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